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IS THE ROBERTS COURT ESPECIALLY ACTIVIST?
A STUDY OF INVALIDATING (AND UPHOLDING) FEDERAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL LAWS
Lee Epstein∗
Andrew D. Martin∗∗
INTRODUCTION
Is the Roberts Court especially activist or, depending on your preference,
especially lacking in judicial self-restraint? If we define judicial self-restraint
as a reluctance to declare legislative action unconstitutional1 and confine the
analysis to the 1969–2009 Terms,2 the answer is no. The Roberts Justices, just
as their immediate predecessors, are neither uniform activists nor committed
restraintists. Rather, the Justices’ votes to strike (and uphold) statutes seem to

∗ Provost Professor of Law and Political Science and the Rader Family Trustee Chair in Law at the
University of Southern California (http://epstein.usc.edu/). This Article was prepared for the 2011 Randolph
W. Thrower Symposium, Emory University School of Law, February 1, 2011.
∗∗ Professor of Law and Political Science at Washington University in St. Louis.
We thank the National Science Foundation and the Center for Empirical Research in the Law at
Washington University for supporting our work on the U.S. Supreme Court. We also thank Stefanie Lindquist
and Chad Westerland for supplying data on cases reviewing the constitutionality of legislative action.
The dataset we use in this Article is available at http://epstein.usc.edu/research/RobertsActivism.html.
1 Richard A. Posner writes that at least three meanings can be assigned to the term “judicial selfrestraint”:

(1) [J]udges apply law, they don’t make it (call this “legalism” . . . or, better, “the law made me
do it”); (2) judges defer, to a very great extent, to decisions by other officials—appellate judges
defer to trial judges and administrative agencies, and all judges to legislative and executive
decisions (call this “modesty,” or “institutional competence,” or “process jurisprudence”); (3)
judges are highly reluctant to declare legislative or executive action unconstitutional—deference
is at its zenith when action is challenged as unconstitutional (call this “constitutional restraint”).
Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 521 (2012). Judge
Posner focuses on (3), as do we. But, unlike Judge Posner, we limit our analysis to legislative action.
2 This caveat is important because Epstein and Landes, analyzing data for a far longer time span (1937–
2009 Terms) but studying federal laws only, reach a somewhat different conclusion. Lee Epstein & William
M. Landes, Was There Ever Such a Thing as Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 557 (2012). They
find that the majority of Justices appointed before the early 1950s were reluctant to strike down laws
regardless of whether the law accorded with their ideological values. Id. at 569–76. But for Justices appointed
since 1952, Epstein & Landes’s findings parallel ours: the vast majority were opportunistic restraintists
(activists), willing to uphold laws that were consistent with their policy preferences and strike those that were
not. Id. at 573–77.
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reflect their political preferences toward the policy content of the law, and not
an underlying preference for restraint (or activism).
In a nutshell, liberal Justices tend to invalidate conservative laws and
conservative Justices, liberal laws. This holds regardless of whether we
examine all the Justices’ votes simultaneously3 or each Justice individually.4
I. SIMPLE APPROACHES TO ANALYZING JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT AND
ACTIVISM
We are not the first to examine judicial self-restraint from an empirical
perspective. To the contrary. More than a handful of law professors and social
scientists have written ambitious papers using large-N datasets and
sophisticated statistical methods.5 Curiously, though, far simpler analyses tend
to dominate contemporary debates6—with Figure 1 providing an example.

3

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
5 Recent examples include STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM (2009); Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation of State Action During the
Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301 (2002); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, A Preference for
Deference? The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 57 POL. RES. Q. 131 (2004); Stefanie A. Lindquist &
Rorie Spill Solberg, Judicial Review by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts: Explaining Justices’ Responses to
Constitutional Challenges, 60 POL. RES. Q. 71 (2007); Rorie Spill Solberg & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Activism,
Ideology, and Federalism: Judicial Behavior in Constitutional Challenges Before the Rehnquist Court, 1986–
2000, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 237 (2006); David L. Weiden, Judicial Politicization, Ideology, and
Activism at the High Courts of the United States, Canada, and Australia, 64 POL. RES. Q. 335 (2011); and
Tom S. Clark & Keith E. Whittington, Ideology, Partisanship, and Judicial Review of Acts of Congress, 1789–
2006 (May 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1475660. Classic empirical studies of judicial invalidation of legislative action include
Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50 (1976);
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB.
L. 279 (1957); and John B. Gates, Partisan Realignment, Unconstitutional State Policies, and the U.S.
Supreme Court, 1837–1964, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 259 (1987).
6 By this, we mean displays or lists showing the fraction of cases in which the Justices were in the
majority when the Court invalidated a (federal, state, or local) law. Examples, in diverse outlets, include LEE
EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS
AND CONSTRAINTS 37 (7th ed. 2011); THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY:
THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 202 tbl.6.2 (2004); and Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, So
Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A19.
4
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Figure 1. Voting with the Majority When the Court Invalidates a Federal,
State, or Local Law, 1969–2009 Terms7

The idea behind Figure 1 (and similar data displays) is that we can learn
about the Justices’ commitment to judicial self-restraint by studying the
fraction of cases in which they vote with the majority when the Court
invalidates legislative action.8 The lower the fraction, the more restrained the
Justice (or so the argument goes). Using this strategy, we would conclude that
the Justices located at the top of Figure 1 exercise greater restraint than the
Justices at the bottom. Some commentators might even draw the inference that
liberals (e.g., Brennan and Marshall) are the more aggressive and conservatives
(e.g., Alito and Rehnquist) the meeker.9
7 Data are from the “Justice-Centered Data: Cases Organized by Supreme Court Citation” version of the
U.S. Supreme Court Database at http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/ and include only orally argued cases
(decisionType = 1, 6, or 7). We exclude Justice Sotomayor, who participated in only five cases in which the
Court invalidated a law.
8 See, e.g., Gewirtz & Golder, supra note 6 (“One conclusion our data suggests is that those justices
often considered more ‘liberal’—Justices Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter and John Paul
Stevens—vote least frequently to overturn Congressional statutes, while those often labeled ‘conservative’
vote more frequently to do so. At least by this measure (others are possible, of course), the latter group is the
most activist.”).
9 And, in fact, the correlation between the fraction and the Justices’ relative liberalism is between .33
and .57 (depending on how we measure the Justices’ ideology), suggesting that liberal Justices are more
activist. For the reasons we offer in the text, however, we should not make much (if anything) of this
correlation.
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As political scientists have pointed out, however, these conclusions would
be premature because Figure 1 is flawed in at least two ways. First, it conveys
whether a Justice is in the majority when the Court reviews the
constitutionality of a law and invalidates it—not when the Court upholds it.10
Besides wasting information (we can learn as much about judicial self-restraint
from all the cases and not just invalidations), examining only “strike” cases can
lead to misleading inferences.11 Imagine a Justice who almost always votes
with the majority when the Court strikes a law (e.g., Justice Marshall in Figure
1). We might conclude that he is an activist. But now suppose the Justice
almost always votes with the majority when the Court upholds a law. Would
we still deem him an “activist”? Probably not.
We could supply many more examples, but the larger point is that we
should consider the fraction of votes to strike in all cases reviewing the
constitutionality of laws. This would go some distance toward distinguishing
between truly aggressive justices—those willing to strike regardless of whether
the Court does—and those who are meeker, voting with the majority regardless
of whether the majority strikes or upholds.12
Analyzing all constitutional review cases would help correct one of Figure
1’s flaws. But not the second, which traces to a failure to consider explanations
other than a Justice’s taste for judicial self-restraint.13 That is, even if we
observe some Justices regularly voting to strike and others to uphold across all
cases, we would not want to make claims about their relative commitment to
judicial self-restraint without examining other possible reasons for the pattern.

10 See, e.g., Clark & Whittington, supra note 5, at 13 (“Neither social science analyses nor narrative
histories of the Court and judicial review give much attention to the cases in which the Court upholds
legislation . . . .”).
11 See Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., The Rhetoric of Restraint and the Ideology of Activism, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 103, 108 (2007); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred
Scope of Judicial Review, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 296, 306 (1993); Clark & Whittington, supra note 5, at 8.
12 By examining all cases, we are able to develop a clearer picture of judicial self-restraint. But there are
other problems that our approach does not solve. E.g., litigants may choose to wait to bring constitutional
challenges until there is a “friendly” Supreme Court, and through the certiorari process, Justices may deny
difficult cases. (For more on this and other problems, see Epstein & Landes, supra note 2.) How these affect
our findings, we are not sure, though we should keep in mind that it takes only one litigant to raise a
constitutional challenge, and in a situation with circuit splits, one losing party will almost always find the
Supreme Court “friendly.” Still, we can generalize the results of our study only to the set of cases that the
Justices agreed to hear and decide.
13 See, e.g., Lindquist et al., supra note 11, at 108; Lindquist & Solberg, supra note 5.
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Of the many possibilities,14 the Justices’ political preferences over the
substantive policy embedded in the law has received considerable attention in
the literature on judicial behavior. The idea is that left-leaning Justices tend to
invalidate “conservative” laws. Vice versa for right-leaning Justices.
A number of studies present evidence supporting this hypothesis,15 and our
data too suggest that it has some merit. In Figure 2, in the left-hand column, we
show the fraction of votes to strike in all cases in which the Court considered
the constitutionality of a conservative law. The right panel shows the same
fraction for liberal laws. Following from the literature,16 we measure the
ideology of the law on the basis of the ideological direction of the Court’s
decision.17

14

See infra Part III for other factors.
See, e.g., LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 5; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 415–16 (2002); Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An
Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 55–58
(2007).
16 See, e.g., LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 5; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 15.
17 Suppose the Court invalidated a law on the ground that it discriminated against gays. We would code
the Court’s decision as liberal and the law as conservative. Fortunately, though, we did not need to make these
decisions because the U.S. Supreme Court Database codes the ideological direction of every Supreme Court
decision since the 1946 Term. From the “decisionDirection” variable, we constructed the ideological direction
of the law. The Database and its definitions of “liberal” and “conservative” are available at http://www.
supremecourtdatabase.org/.
15
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Figure 2. Voting to Invalidate a Federal, State, or Local Law in All Cases
Reviewing the Constitutionality of a Law, 1969–2009 Terms18

A clear pattern emerges. The conservative Justices (e.g., Alito, Rehnquist,
Roberts, and Thomas) appear at the top of the left panel of the figure, meaning
that they exercise “judicial restraint” when reviewing conservative laws;
liberals (e.g., Black, Ginsburg, Brennan, and Souter), on the other hand, appear
at the top of the right panel revealing a similar level of “restraint” over liberal
laws.
Statistical analyses confirm this visual inspection. A regression of the
fraction to invalidate conservative laws on the Justices’ ideology produces a
statistically significant coefficient19 regardless of how we measure ideology.20
18 Stefanie Lindquist provided citations to the cases in which the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a
law during the Burger and Rehnquist Court years (1969–2004 Terms); we updated the case list following her
protocols. See LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 5; Lindquist & Solberg, supra note 5; Solberg & Lindquist,
supra note 5. The Justices’ votes come from the “Justice-Centered Data: Cases Organized by Supreme Court
Citation” version of the U.S. Supreme Court Database, available at http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/. We
exclude Justice Sotomayor (N = 18).
19 When we use the term “statistically significant,” we mean p ≤ .05.
20 For this and all analyses to follow, we estimate the statistical models using three different measures of
the Justices’ ideology: (1) their political party affiliation (Republican or Democrat), (2) the mean of their
Martin–Quinn score (which is based on the Justices’ votes in non-unanimous cases), and (3) their Segal &
Cover score. (1) is available in LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS,
AND DEVELOPMENTS (5th ed. 2011). We computed (2) from the Term-by-Term Martin–Quinn scores. See
Measures, MARTIN–QUINN SCORES, http://www.mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php (last visited July 5, 2012).
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For example, using Segal & Cover’s time-tested ideology scores (derived from
an analysis of newspaper editorials written prior to the Senate’s confirmation
vote),21 the likelihood of a very conservative Justice (e.g., a Scalia) voting to
invalidate a conservative law is a modest .27;22 for a very liberal Justice (e.g., a
Brennan), the predicted probability jumps to .76.23 Put another way, out of
every ten conservative laws, the model expects conservative Justices to
invalidate three and liberal Justices, seven. When the Court reviews a liberal
law, the conservative Justices are more likely to strike (.46) than the liberals
(.17).24
These regressions consider all the Justices simultaneously. Reestimating
them for the Justices individually yields similar results. Of the twenty-one
serving between the 1969 and 2009 Terms, eighteen exhibit aggressive (and
meek) behavior that aligns with their ideology to a statistically significant
degree.25 Only Justices Harlan, O’Connor, and Kennedy do not fit the
pattern—and O’Connor is borderline.26
II. MODELING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND SELF-RESTRAINT
Figure 2 seems to provide a powerful demonstration of the effect of the
Justices’ ideology (vis-à-vis the policy content of the law) on their votes to
overturn and uphold legislation. Unless we make the heroic assumption that
ideology is the only variable that affects votes to invalidate and uphold
legislative action, however, it too is insufficient. Other factors likely to play a

For information on how these scores are computed, see Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme
Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1503 & n.88, 1527 n.156 (2007);
and Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo
for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). (3)—the Segal & Cover scores—are
available online. See Perceived Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme Court Nominees, 1937–2005, STONY
BROOK U., http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/polisci/professors/qualtable.pdf (last visited July 5, 2012).
They run from 0 (most conservative) to 1 (most liberal). Id. For details on how Segal & Cover calculate the
scores, see Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559–61 (1989).
For purposes of exposition, we report only the Segal & Cover scores in the text. Using the two other
scores does not produce substantively different results.
21 See Segal & Cover, supra note 20.
22 The 95% confidence interval is [.15, .38].
23 The 95% confidence interval is [.62, .90].
24 The 95% confidence interval for the conservative Justices is [.36, .56]. For the liberals, it is [.05, .29].
25 Again, we exclude Justice Sotomayor because she participated in only eighteen cases in which the
Court reviewed the constitutionality of legislative action.
26 p = .10.
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role center on (1) the Court’s case-selection process, (2) features of the law
under review, and (3) the contemporaneous political environment.27
To attend to the selection process, we include three variables.28 The first,
Direction of the Lower Court’s Decision (coded 1 for liberal; 0 if otherwise),
controls for the modern Supreme Court’s propensity to grant petitions to
reverse the decision of the court below (i.e., even a very liberal majority will
tend to reverse a decision below that upholds a liberal law, and vice versa for a
conservative majority).29 Second, we include dummy variables for the three
Chief Justice eras represented in the analysis: Burger (1969–1985 Terms),
Rehnquist (1986–2004), and Roberts (2005–2009).30 These serve as rough
proxies for changes in the procedures for processing cases. Finally, we
incorporate a variable, Certiorari (1 if the case came on certiorari; 0 if
otherwise), to control for the means by which the case arrived at the Court. As
Whittington and Clark observe, when the Court has complete discretion over
whether to hear a case (as on certiorari), the Justices are free to focus their
attention only on those “that raise serious doubts about the constitutional
validity of government policies.”31 When the Court is more constrained, the
challenge to the legislative action may be relatively weak. (Alternatively, to
assess the robustness of our results, we include a variable for before and after
passage of the Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988.32)
Turning to (2), the law under review, three relevant variables come to
mind: whether the U.S. Congress enacted it, its substantive coverage, and its
age. All else being equal, we expect the Court to be less likely to strike federal
27 We derive these from previous studies. See, e.g., Epstein & Landes, supra note 2; Howard & Segal,
supra note 5; Lindquist et al., supra note 15; Lindquist & Solberg, supra note 5; Clark & Whittington, supra
note 5.
28 Ideally, we would also model the selection process. See Lindquist & Solberg, supra note 5, at 76–77
(“[W]e note that the judicial review cases heard by the Supreme Court do not arise on the Court’s docket at
random. Instead, the Court’s certiorari process is complex and often involves strategic calculations on the part
of the justices. . . . [I]f court intervention is nonrandom, ignoring this selection process raises the likelihood
that conclusions about the forces affecting subsequent votes to invalidate legislation will be inaccurate.”
(citations omitted)); supra note 12.
29 Between the 1969 and 2009 Terms, the petitioning party won in 63% of the 4631 cases. This
percentage was computed from the U.S. Supreme Court Database at http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/,
using orally argued cases and the “partyWinning” variable.
30 Burger is the omitted era.
31 Clark & Whittington, supra note 5, at 21; accord Colker & Scott, supra note 5, at 1325 (“[T]he Court
has considerable control over its docket and therefore tends to accept certiorari on cases in which it desires to
reverse the lower court.”).
32 Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 3, 102 Stat. 662, 662 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006)) (eliminating
appeals as a matter of right from state court decisions and substituting certiorari).
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laws (= 1) relative to legislative action in the states or localities (= 0). In part,
this expectation reflects the claim that the Justices should or would be wary of
invalidating a law enacted by a majority of representatives from all fifty states
unless they are reasonably sure about its unconstitutionality.33 This expectation
also accounts for the fact that the Office of the Solicitor General (SG) usually
defends federal laws in the Supreme Court. Relative to the SG—a very
effective and successful legal team by almost any measure—state and local
attorneys are more of a mixed bag.34 Of course, the SG can file an amicus
curiae brief in cases involving the constitutionality of state and local legislative
action, and we attend to this with two variables (whether the SG supported the
law or supported invalidation).
The type of statute also may be important because, under existing
precedent, laws centering on rights and liberties (coded 1) are presumably
subjected to more rigorous standards of review than are economic statutes
(coded 0). Finally, we control for the age of the law at the time of the Court’s
decision.35 Although debatable, Dahl’s famous study suggests that older and
less important laws are riper for invalidation than newer statutes.36 The
mechanism, on Dahl’s account, is Article II’s command: “[The President] shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court.”37 Assuming the President and
Senate have regular opportunities to appoint new Justices, “the policy views
dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views
dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”38
Many scholars agree that the existing regime has a role to play in judicial
review, but they take issue with Dahl’s mechanism. To them (and us), the
33 Even Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, “I do not think the United States would come to an end if we
lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not
make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court,
Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295–96 (1920).
34 At the least, they are not the “repeat player” that the federal government is. For studies on the SG, see,
e.g., Michael A. Bailey et al., Signals from the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in
Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 72 (2005); Chris Nicholson & Paul M. Collins, Jr., The
Solicitor General’s Amicus Curiae Strategies in the Supreme Court, 36 AM. POL. RES. 382 (2008); and Jeffrey
A. Segal, Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the Warren and Burger Courts, 41 W. POL. Q.
135 (1988).
35 We thank Stefanie Lindquist for supplying this information for the 1969–2004 Terms. We updated her
data through the 2009 Term. See supra note 18.
36 Dahl, supra note 5; accord Lindquist et al., supra note 11.
37 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
38 Dahl, supra note 5, at 285.
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mechanism is not the appointment process but rather the Justices’ institutional
interest in avoiding collisions with contemporaneous political actors.39 When
the Court invalidates laws that Congress, the President, and, presumably, the
public desire, it runs the risk of backlash in the form of jurisdiction-stripping
laws, budget slashing, or worse.40 To capture this take on Dahl’s account,41 we
include variables designed to measure the public’s mood (from very liberal to
very conservative)42 and the partisan composition of the elected branches.43
To summarize, we expect four sets of factors to influence the Justices’
exercise of judicial self-restraint: (1) the Justices’ ideology vis-à-vis the law,
(2) the case-selection process, (3) the type of legislative enactment, and (4) the
political context. We describe each in Table 1.

39 E.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583
(2001); Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced Selection Bias in the
Supreme Court’s Agenda, 71 J. POL. 574 (2009). For the most conclusive evidence to date of the effect of
Congress on the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, see Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Congress, the Supreme
Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 89
(2011).
40 For a list of weapons Congress and the President have at their disposal in the constitutional context,
see Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 376–77
(1992); and Epstein et al., supra note 39, at 597–601.
41 Dahl’s story is about national institutions, while our study includes constitutional review of state and
local laws. Nonetheless, we focus on the nation’s mood and federal institutions because, we might speculate, a
state/local law well outside the bounds of constitutionality and opposed by the national governing coalition
would be unlikely to reach the Court. Moreover, most state/local laws that do reach the Court may well
implicate national political interests (or, at the least, have implications beyond the law in question) given
Supreme Court Rule 10 (which emphasizes “important” questions). See SUP. CT. R. 10.
42 To capture the public’s mood, we use Stimson’s measure. Stimson computes the measure by analyzing
survey responses to a number of questions that tap an underlying liberal–conservative dimension. See JAMES
A. STIMSON, PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA: MOODS, CYCLES, AND SWINGS (2d ed. 1999); Policy Mood, U. N.C.
CHAPEL HILL, http://www.unc.edu/~cogginse/Policy_Mood.html (last visited July 5, 2012). He provides a
dynamic factor analysis model that combines these responses in a principled fashion to yield a quarterly and
annual measure of public mood as a single score. See STIMSON, supra; Policy Mood, supra.
43 We added variables to indicate whether the government was unified Republican or unified Democratic.
For more sophisticated approaches, see Segal et al., supra note 39.
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Table 1. Description of Basic Variables
Mean
(Standard
Deviation)

Variable and Coding
Dependent Variables
Vote to Invalidate (= 1) or Not (= 0) if Legislative Action Is
Liberal
Vote to Invalidate (= 1) or Not (= 0) if Legislative Action Is
Conservative
Independent Variables
Justice’s Ideology (most conservative = 0; most liberal = 1)44
Direction of the Lower Court’s Decision
conservative = 0)
Case Came on Certiorari (= 1) or Not (= 0)

(liberal = 1;

Federal Law (= 1) or Not (= 0)
SG Conservative Amicus (= 1) or Not (= 0)
SG Liberal Amicus (= 1) or Not (= 0)
Civil Liberties Law (= 1) or Not (= 0)
Age of Law (at time of the decision)
Unified Democratic Government (Congress and the President)
(= 1) or Not (= 0)
Unified Republican Government (Congress and the President)
(= 1) or Not (= 0)
Public’s Mood (lower numbers are more conservative)

0.338
0.473
0.506
0.500
0.402
0.332
0.543
0.498
0.511
0.500
0.289
0.454
0.100
0.300
0.055
0.228
0.772
0.420
15.096
19.344
0.203
0.403
0.076
0.264
56.507
3.442

Note: Our dataset contains 7415 votes (5295 over conservative laws and 2040 for liberal
laws) cast in 842 cases. The N for the following variables is smaller: (1) Age of Law (7352)
because we could not identify the age in seven cases; (2) Direction of the Lower Court
Decision (7299) because it is not specified in the Supreme Court Database in thirteen cases;
and (3) Public’s Mood (7326) because it is not available for cases argued in 2010.

44 In Table 2, we report the Segal & Cover score. We also estimated the models using the Justices’
partisan affiliation and their Martin–Quinn scores. See supra note 20.

EPSTEIN&MARTIN GALLEYS5

748

7/12/2012 3:38 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:737

III. RESULTS: JUSTICES COMBINED
We begin our assessment of the impact of the variables in Table 1 by
modeling the votes (to uphold or invalidate) of all twenty-two Justices
(including Sotomayor) in two basic equations: one for liberal laws and the
other for conservative laws.45 (In the next Part, we also estimate the two basic
equations but examine the Justices individually.)
Table 2 displays the results. Note, first, that across all four models several
variables help account for the Justices’ votes to strike or uphold. For example,
when the Court reviews the constitutionality of a federal law, it is more likely
to uphold it relative to state or local legislative action. For liberal statutes, eq. 3
predicts that the Court sustains about seven out of every ten laws passed by
Congress but only six out of every ten enacted in the states or localities.46 For
right-leaning statutes (eq. 4), the Justices are more likely to invalidate state and
local policies than to uphold them (.53 [.49, .57] predicted probability to
strike). Not so of conservative congressional laws: the predicted probability of
invalidation is only .32.47

45 We estimated them with and without the mood measure because it is unavailable for cases argued in
2010. Also, to check for robustness, we estimated each model using a random-effects logistic regression under
the assumption that there may be some unaccounted factors that affect each Justice’s propensity to strike the
legislative action. Including a Justice-specific random effect, which allows each Justice to have her own
baseline, helps to attend to these unmodeled factors. As the note to Table 2 indicates, it does not matter
whether we estimate the models using random-effects regression or logistic regression (clustered on the
Justice). Ideology is significant in all the models.
46 With all other variables set at their mean or mode, the predicted probability of upholding a state/local
law is .61 [.54, .68]; for federal laws, the figure is .71 [.61, .81]. To calculate the predicted probabilities, we
used eq. 3.
47 We used eq. 4 with all other variables set at their mean or mode. The 95% confidence interval is [.28,
.36].
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Table 2. Logistic Regressions of the Justices’ Votes to Invalidate (= 1) or
Uphold (= 0) Legislative Action, 1969–2009 Terms
Variable
Justice’s Ideology
Liberal Lower Court
Certiorari
Federal Law
Dummy for
Rehnquist Era
Dummy for Roberts
Era
Conservative SG
Amicus
Liberal SG Amicus
Civil Liberties Law
Age of Law
Unified Democratic
Unified Republican
Public Mood
Constant

With Public Mood
Liberal
Conservative
Law
Law
(1)
(2)
-1.388*
2.273*
(0.262)
(0.440)
0.623*
-0.270*
(0.106)
(0.049)
-0.015
0.016
(0.159)
(0.105)
-0.423*
-0.916*
(0.162)
(0.089)
0.677*
0.295*
(0.235)
(0.147)
0.733
-0.269
(0.405)
(0.289)
0.434*
-0.832*
(0.165)
(0.121)
-0.478*
0.645*
(0.137)
(0.225)
-0.023
0.142
(0.253)
(0.132)
-0.000
-0.004*
(0.003)
(0.001)
-0.251
-0.002
(0.130)
(0.101)
-0.705*
0.057
(0.204)
(0.167)
-0.162*
-0.009
(0.040)
(0.019)
8.416*
-0.110
(2.078)
(1.091)
1977
5170
-1159.084
-3129.070

Without Public Mood
Liberal
Conservative
Law
Law
(3)
(4)
-1.450*
2.229*
(0.250)
(0.442)
0.496*
-0.269*
(0.119)
(0.049)
-0.023
0.019
(0.175)
(0.106)
-0.448*
-0.885*
(0.157)
(0.092)
-0.236
0.264*
(0.151)
(0.124)
-0.233*
-0.394
(0.279)
(0.211)
0.484*
-0.811*
(0.166)
(0.122)
-0.426*
0.661*
(0.138)
(0.228)
-0.053
0.141
(0.242)
(0.137)
-0.001
-0.004*
(0.003)
(0.001)
0.217*
0.022
(0.100)
(0.104)
-0.449
0.091
(0.239)
(0.188)
_____
_____
0.395
(0.178)
2013
-1205.065

-0.817*
(0.309)
5223
-3167.552

N of Votes
Log Likelihood
Notes:
(1) p ≤ .05. Variables statistically significant (at p ≤ .05) and correctly signed across all
models are in italics. Standard errors are in parentheses. For all four models, we
clustered on Justice.
(2) Includes all twenty-two Justices serving between the 1969 and 2009 Terms.
(3) We present models with (1 & 2) and without (3 & 4) Public Mood because mood
data are available only for cases argued through 2009.
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(4) We conducted two types of robustness checks: (1) we substituted two other
measures for the Segal & Cover scores; and (2) we estimated the models using
random-effects logistic regression, with the “panel” set to Justice.48 Neither
produced substantively different results.

We do not know whether the preference for federal over state and local
laws reflects extreme reluctance to invalidate action taken by the U.S.
Congress or the expertise of the SG. We can report, though, that the presence
of the SG as an amicus curiae exerts a statistically significant effect on the
Court’s willingness to strike or uphold state/local policies. Suppose the Justices
are reviewing a liberal state (or local) law, and the SG files in support. The
odds of the Court upholding the law are relatively high (.71 [.64, .77]).49 But
should the SG argue for invalidation, the odds of upholding fall to about 50–
50.50 We see a similar, though even more dramatic, effect for conservative
state/local laws. The probability flips from .67 to uphold when the SG files in
support51 to .69 to invalidate when the SG files in opposition.52
No doubt, then, a host of factors affect the Justices’ votes. And yet, the
basic ideological effect unearthed in Figure 2 remains. Regardless of how we
specify the models in Table 2, we cannot wipe out the central finding that
conservative Justices are significantly more likely to strike liberal statutes and
liberals, conservative laws.53 The statistical effect is that persistent and that
consistent. It is also quite strong, as Figure 3 shows.

48
49
50
51

See supra note 20.
We used eq. 3 with all other variables set at their mean or mode.
.49 [.39, .59].
We used eq. 4 with all other variables set at their mean or mode. The 95% confidence interval is [.54,

.79].
52
53

The 95% confidence interval is [.56, .81].
See supra notes accompanying Table 2.
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Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Invalidating Legislative Action Across the
Range of Ideology

Notes:
(1) The panel on the left is based on eq. 3 in Table 2. The panel on the right is from eq.
4. All other variables are set at their mean or mode.
(2) The solid line shows the predicted probability; the dashed lines show the upper and
lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.

Starting with the left panel, the probability of invalidating a liberal law
decreases from .52 to an improbable .20 as we move from the most
conservative to most liberal Justices, all else being equal. As for conservative
laws, the probability declines even more dramatically, from a .81 invalidation
prediction for the most liberal Justices to .31 for the extreme conservatives.
Does this suggest that the liberal Justices are more “strike happy” (i.e.,
more activist) than the conservatives? Perhaps.54 But the comparison assumes
an equal number of opportunities to invalidate conservative and liberal laws—
an assumption that the data do not meet. As the totals in Table 2 indicate,

54 To reiterate, for liberal laws, extreme conservatives invalidate about 52% of the time, compared to
81% for extreme liberals.
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between the 1969 and 2009 Terms, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of
conservative laws nearly three times as often as liberal laws.55
Finally, and of special relevance to our claim about the Roberts Justices,
the effect of ideology is relatively consistent across all three Chief Justice eras.
Variations on all the regressions in Table 2 yield significant coefficients on the
Justice’s Ideology variable when we estimate them separately by Chief Justice
era.56 Figure 4 displays the predictions.
Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Invalidating Legislative Action Across the
Range of Ideology, by Chief Justice Era
4a. Liberal Law

55 Although we can only speculate on why this is the case, the answer must come from either the supply
side or the demand side—the supply of legal provisions to review or the demand to review by the Justices. On
the supply side, much of the existing law was conservative, especially in the domains of civil rights and civil
liberties. On the demand side, a Court with a liberal majority, at least until the presidency of George H.W.
Bush, would typically choose to review conservative laws, all else being equal. On this logic, we would expect
the Roberts Court to consider the constitutionality of a greater number of liberal legal provisions than
conservative ones.
56 See infra notes accompanying Figure 4.
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4b. Conservative Law

Notes:
(1) The solid line shows the predicted probability; the dashed lines show the upper and
lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.
(2) In all panels, we constrain ideology to under 0.8 because no Justice on the Roberts
Court has an ideology score in the 0.8–1.0 range.
(3) The predictions follow from eqs. 3 & 4 in Table 2. Also, for purposes of estimating
the same model across all three eras, we dropped Certiorari, Unified Democrat,
and Unified Republican (which created collinearity problems in some of the
equations).

Looking across the panels, a similar pattern emerges. Conservatives are far
more likely to strike liberal laws, while the liberals are far more likely to
uphold them. The same holds in reverse for conservative laws.
And it generally holds for the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Justices,
though some potentially intriguing trends emerge. Turning first to the left wing
of the Court, a comparison of the two panels in Figure 4 shows that the liberals
have grown less willing to strike liberal laws, from a predicted probability of
.35 during the Burger years, to .23 during the Rehnquist Court, to .06 for the
Roberts years. But they are also less likely to strike laws with conservative
policy content (the predicted probability declines from .78 in the Rehnquist era
to .62 in the Roberts era). The right wing of the Court, on the other hand, has
grown somewhat more opportunistically restraintist (activist). The
conservative Justices are less willing to invalidate conservative laws, from a
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predicted probability of .36 during the Rehnquist years to .15 for the Roberts
era. At the same time, as Figure 4b shows, their willingness to strike laws has
increased slightly, from .55 (Rehnquist Court) to .58 (Roberts Court).
IV. RESULTS: INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
Whether these are trends or blips due to data sparseness for the Roberts
Court, we cannot say. Moreover, even if they are trends, we do not know if
they reflect a growing tendency toward judicial self-restraint on the part of the
liberals (and opportunistic restraint on the part of conservatives) or unmodeled
features of the case-selection process.
What we can do is explore how many of the individual Justices conform to
the basic patterns unearthed in Table 2 and Figure 4. We do so by estimating
separate regression models for each of the nineteen Justices with fifty or more
case participations. Table 3 displays the results.57

57

This eliminates Justices Black (N = 37), Harlan (N = 44), and Sotomayor (N = 18).
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Table 3. Predicted Probability of Invalidating Legislative Action for Nineteen
Justices with More Than Fifty Case Participations, 1969–2009 Terms
Justice (Order from
Most Conservative to
Most Liberal58) (N)
Thomas (247)
Rehnquist (682)
Scalia (362)
Burger (458)
Alito (59)
Roberts (65)
Powell (415)
O’Connor (415)
Kennedy (323)
Stewart (336)
White (606)
Blackmun (600)
Souter (241)
Breyer (200)
Ginsburg (206)
Stevens (636)
Brennan (550)
Marshall (561)
Douglas (158)

58

Coefficient on
“Law”
(1 = liberal; 0 =
otherwise)
1.847*
(0.329)
1.649*
(0.241)
1.416*
(0.271)
0.674*
(0.289)
5.277*
(1.769)
1.509*
(0.699)
-0.761*
(0.287)
0.382
(0.240)
0.252
(0.263)
-0.499
(0.355)
-0.838*
(0.255)
-1.478*
(0.263)
-2.237*
[0.355]
-1.838*
[0.382]
-2.309*
[0.368]
-1.882*
[0.229]
-3.530*
(0.360)
-3.343*
(0.324)
-3.573*
(0.772)

We used the mean of the Martin–Quinn scores.

Predicted Probability
of Striking a
Conservative Law
0.20
[0.13, 0.28]
0.17
[0.13, 0.22]
0.27
[0.21, 0.35]
0.36
[0.29, 0.44]
0.02
[0.00-0.09]
0.17
[0.06-0.37]
0.50
[0.42, 0.59]
____

Predicted
Probability of
Striking a Liberal
Law
0.62
[0.47, 0.76]
0.51
[0.40, 0.63]
0.61
[0.47, 0.72]
0.53
[0.38, 0.67]
0.54
[0.10-0.94]
0.46
[0.16-0.79]
0.32
[0.20, 0.45]
____

____

____

____

____

0.46
[0.39, 0.53]
0.62
[0.55, 0.69]
0.71
[0.60, 0.80]
0.53
[0.41, 0.65]
0.67
[0.54, 0.78]
0.72
[0.66, 0.77]
0.89
[0.84, 0.92]
0.89
[0.85, 0.93]
0.90
[0.80, 0.96]

0.27
[0.17, 0.39]
0.28
[0.19, 0.39]
0.22
[0.11, 0.35]
0.16
[0.07, 0.29]
0.17
[0.08, 0.30]
0.28
[0.20, 0.38]
0.20
[0.11, 0.32]
0.23
[0.14, 0.36]
0.23
[0.05, 0.52]
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Notes:
(1) p ≤ .05.
(2) We estimated the coefficients via logistic-regression models, with robust standard
errors. In addition to a variable indicating whether the law was liberal or
conservative, the models include (from Table 2) Liberal Lower Court Decision,
Federal Law, Civil Liberties Law, and Age of Law.59 To assess robustness, we also
estimated the model with asymptotic standard errors, with robust standard errors
clustered by Term, and with a random-effects logistic-regression model. These
alternative specifications do not affect the basic results or substantive conclusions.
(3) We estimated the predicted probabilities using the same model for each Justice and
setting all variables (except the ideological content of the law) at their mean or
mode. We do not estimate probabilities for Justices with coefficients that are not
statistically significant on the variable indicating the ideological direction of the
law.

Even after controlling for other factors that might influence votes to
invalidate or sustain legislation, ideology exerts a significant effect for sixteen
of the nineteen Justices (84%). The five most conservative Justices in our
dataset (Thomas, Rehnquist, Scalia, Burger, and Alito) are all highly unlikely
to invalidate conservative laws. The range in the predicted probabilities of
invalidating is narrow, from .36 for Burger to .02 for Alito. The five most
liberal Justices (Douglas, Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, and Ginsburg), on the
other hand, are highly unlikely to sustain conservative laws. The model
predicts that Ginsburg, the most likely of the five to uphold, votes to strike in
seven out of every ten cases; Douglas, the least likely, strikes in nine out of
ten. The story is much the same for left-leaning laws, only in the reverse.
Moving down the third column (from the most conservative to most liberal
Justice), the predicted probability of invalidating a liberal law declines in a
near monotonic fashion.
What of the Roberts Justices? Though it may be too soon to say much
about Alito and Roberts (their Ns are small and the confidence intervals around
the predictions, large), they conform to the basic ideological pattern. Both are
significantly more likely to uphold conservative laws and invalidate leftleaning policy. The ideological effect is even starker for the more extreme
conservatives, Scalia and Thomas. As for the four left-leaning Justices in our
59 We included these variables, and not others in Table 2, to maximize the number of cases and to
minimize collinearity problems in some of the models (and to depict the coefficients for the same model for
each Justice). We assessed robustness by adding as many variables as we could to each model. The basic
findings remain unchanged.
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dataset (Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens), they too evince a different
approach to judicial review, based on the underlying policy content of the law.
The Court’s “super median,”60 Justice Kennedy, is more of a puzzle.
Judged on the basis of whether he was in the majority when the Court struck
down legislative action, Kennedy is the most aggressive of the Roberts
Justices.61 When the Court invalidated a federal, state, or local law between the
2005–2009 Terms, Kennedy was in the majority 94% of the time. Only
Roberts (at 72%) came close. But, unlike the other Roberts Justices, no
underlying ideological pattern seems to exist to Kennedy’s votes; as a
statistical matter, he is equally as likely to sustain (or invalidate) conservative
as liberal laws.
If, however, we consider only laws reviewed by the Court since the start of
the Roberts Court years, even Kennedy’s ideology shows in his votes—he too
is now substantially more likely to strike liberal laws than conservative laws.62
Along these lines, Figure 5 is illuminating. There we compare the predicted
probabilities of invalidating laws for Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Alito
since the 2005 Term. All else being equal, Kennedy is not as extreme as either
Roberts or Breyer, but the difference in his willingness to invalidate liberal
versus conservative law is substantial: 38% versus 16%.

60

Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37 (2008).
And, indeed, Kennedy is the most aggressive Justice in our entire dataset. See Figure 1.
62 He is significantly (p = .03) more likely to invalidate liberal state/local policies, though not federal
laws. Modeling all laws in one equation (with a variable indicating whether the law was federal or state/local)
yields a p-value of .07 on the Ideology of the Law variable. The p-value for all Terms prior to 2004 is not close
to statistically significant (.84).
61
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Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Invalidating a Law for Justices Ginsburg,
Kennedy, and Alito, 2005–2009 Terms

Note: We generated the predictions using the same models in Table 3, except we limited
them to the Roberts Court years.

CONCLUSION
Ours will certainly not be the last word on judicial review during the
Roberts years. The data we have amassed cover only the first five Terms of the
current era. As Justices come and go, the Court may move further to the right,
turn sharply to the left, or perhaps steer a more moderate course. Whether the
underlying patterns we have uncovered will dissipate remains another story. At
least since 1969,63 there is a clear ideological structure to the Court’s review of
the constitutionality of federal, state, and local laws—the Roberts Justices not
excepted.

63

And maybe well before. See Epstein & Landes, supra note 2; Clark & Whittington, supra note 5.

